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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
RESTITUTION-RIGHT OF RECOVERY FOR BENEFIT CON-
FERRED ON LAND HELD UNDER FRAUDULENT CLAIM
OF TITLE
Johanna Held, owner of certain real estate located in South Dakota,
died in May, 1941. Subsequent to her death, plaintiffs claimed title to
this property under deeds allegedly executed and delivered to them by
the decedent. In an action brought by decedent's administrator, these
deeds were found to be void as obtained through fraud, and the present
plaintiffs were found to be accountable for the reasonable rental value of
premises during their occupancy. Plaintiffs brought the present action
in equity to recover amounts paid by them for taxes, water assessments,
repairs and for improvements made while in possession of the property.
They contended that to deny recovery would permit the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendants contrary to equitable principles. Held: Re-
covery denied. A plaintiff will not be granted relief in a court of equity
from a situation in which his own fraudulent acts placed him, at the
expense of the very person whom he tried to defraud. Morris et. al. v.
Crilly, 29 N.W. (2d) 805 (South Dakota, 1947).
A search of the cases has failed to disclose a decision exactly in
point. The court, confronted with the problem, applied principles laid
down in cases dealing with conveyances made in fraud of creditors,
contending that the plaintiff was in no different or better position than
a grantee who knowingly takes a conveyance to aid in a scheme to de-
fraud the grantor's creditors. The pertinent rule as laid down in these
cases is that such a grantee can not come into equity and obtain affirm-
ative relief on account of taxes paid or expense had in connection
with the property,1 leaving the plaintiff to whatever relief he may have
at law.
Tracing this matter to the earliest recognition of the problem, it is
found that under the rules of the common law whoever put improve-
ments on real estate did so at his peril. This was true even though such
person acted in good faith in the sincere belief that the land was his. If
at some subsequent time another party judicially established his title to
land, such party had a right to all the improvements situated upon it,2
unless an implied contract to the contrary could be established. This
rule was founded upon the principle that the owner should not be re-
quired to pay a mere occupant for improvements which he never au-
thorized. As a matter of public policy, the above rule was believed to
discourage encroachments upon the property of others and to insure
diligence in the examination of titles.
I Annotation, 8 A.L.R. 542 (1920).
2 Graham v. Connersville and N.C. junction Ry. Co., 36 Ind. 463 (1871);
Washburn v. Sproat, 16 Mass. 449 (1820); Hill on Fixtures sec. 45.
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On the Continent the civil law evolved a more liberal policy. Any-
one who made permanent improvements on land in his possession, un-
der the bona fide belief that he was owner of it, was permitted to exact
full compensation for the value of such improvements, less the value
of the use of the land, before he could be compelled to surrender it.3
In England the courts of equity were influenced at an early date by
the rule of the civil law.4 Where the true owner brought suit in Chan-
cery seeking an accounting against an occupant for mesne profits after
a recovery of the land at law, the court refused its aid to the complain-
ant unless the innocent holder was compensated for his improvements
upon the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.
Eventually this rule was adopted, in part, by the common law courts,
but the value of the holder's compensation for such improvements could
never exceed the claim of the owner for profits,5 and would be com-
pletely barred unless mesne profits were claimed.6
The reader will note that the remedies indicated above provided
negative relief only. Until recently there was no jurisdiction in Eng-
land or the United States in which it was possible for the occupant to
recover the value of his improvements in an affirmative action at law,
nor by the prevailing rule could this be done in equity in the absence
of fraud or acquiesence on the part of the landowner.7 Even today,
except for a few isolated decisions,8 affirmative relief has not been
granted in the absence of statute. Many states now have specific statu-
tory provisions providing for direct affirmative proceedings against the
owner. They are usually incorporated in so called "betterment acts"
or "occupying claimants acts." 9 Difficulty has arisen in the application
of these statutes to particular situations. The decisions follow two lines
of construction. On one hand the contention is made that such statutes
are founded upon equitable principles and as such should be liberally
construed so as to secure a fair adjustment of the rights of the parties.
On the other hand there are those that argue since such statutes are in
derogation of the common law they must be strictly construed. Under
these statutes, the general rule is that an occupying claimant is not
entitled to compensation for his improvements unless at the time the
improvements were made he was in actual occupancy of the premises
3 Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, Lake County (Colorado), 133 U.S. 553, 10 S. Ct.
374 (1889).
4 Fn. 3, Supra; Story, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1237 (Rev. ed., 1846), Boston,
C.C. Little & J. Brown.
5 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat, U.S. 1, 5 L. ed. 547 (1823).
6 104 A.L.R. 578 (1936).
7 Bigelow v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 206 Iowa 884, 221 N.W. 661 (1928).
8 104 A.L.R. 588 (1936). Relief was confined to occupants who held land in
bona fide belief that they had good title.
9 For typical statute, see Sec. 275.24 Wis. Stat. (1945).
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under a possession which was adverse to the rights of the actual owner
but maintained by the claimant in the belief that he had good title.",
It will be observed that even under these liberal statutes affirmative
relief is limited to the holder who occupied the land under honest if
mistaken belief of valid ownership. Obviously then even in jurisdic-
tions having adopted these statutes"' the holder with knowledge of his
defective title who makes improvements will be unable to invoke the
statutory remedy. However, if upon general equitable principles, one
who has mistakenly improved the land of another is entitled to relief,
such relief is not lost because of the existence of such a statute unless
the peculiar language of the statute is such as to produce that result. 2
This survey indicates that the plaintiff in the principal case was
without any remedy at law. If relief could be had it would have to be
in equity. It remains to be decided whether the South Dakota court
was correct in denying equitable relief, and in applying by analogy the
rule in fraudulent conveyance cases.
According to Pomeroy the principle invoked denying relief in these
decisions is that one who knowingly takes a conveyance or assignment
to aid and abet a scheme to defraud creditors can not be regarded as
coming into court with clean hands."3 A distinction is made in such
cases between actual and constructive fraud. If the grantee is not guilty
of actual fraud"- but is chargeable with knowledge of such facts that
the law holds him guilty of constructive fraud, it would seem that on
the setting aside of the conveyance, he is equitably entitled to reim-
bursement for sums expended by him in good faith to discharge taxes
or prior mortgages on the property.
Glenn maintains that no such distinction should be made. He points
out that the distinction arose out of the old English Criminal Statutes
designed to increase crown revenues and that the practice was adopted
to protect persons guilty of only constructive fraud from the harsh
forfeitures under these laws. These statutes should have no effect on
civil rights. It should further be noted that the primary purpose of this
branch of the law is to remove obstacles from the path of the creditor
in reaching his debtor's assets. Hence equity should not overlook the
claim of a grantee who has preserved an asset.' 5 The courts have ap-
parently begun to relax the rule as to the absolute denial even of nega-
tive relief for those guilty of actual fraud in fraudulent conveyance
cases.'
16
20 American Jurisprudence, Vol. 27, Improvements, sec. 8.
11 South Dakota does not have such a statute.
104 A.L.R. 607 (1936).
'a Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Part II, Ch. I, Sec. IV, Par. 401c.
14 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, Vol. I, Sec. 250.
"5Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, Vol. I, Sec. 256.
16Ackerman v. Merle, 137 Calif. 169, 69 P. 983 (1902); Smith v. Grimes, 43
Iowa 356 (1876); 8 A.L.R. 533 (1920).
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Glenn argues that the test of every such credit should be whether
the payment was devoted to the interests of the property or only for
the personal convenience of the grantee..7
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution seems to subscribe to
Glenn's point of view. Section 158 reads:
A person is entitled to specific restitution of property from
another or to the product from such property only on the con-
dition that he compensate the other for expenditures with refer-
ence to the subject matter which have inured to his benefit, to
the extent that justice between the parties requires.
It will be observed that even advanced views of Glenn and the
Restatement confine the suggested remedy to a purely defensive role.
As a matter of fact the writer has been unable to locate a single re-
ported decision, or an article for that matter, supporting the contention
that the occupant guilty of fraud, actual or constructive, should have
the right to compensation in an affirmative action for expenses incurred
in connection with property obtained through the fraud.
In conclusion then, from the arguments presented in the reported
cases one may conclude that the issue will be decided through the ap-
plication of two frequently antagonistic equitable principles; namely,
the "clean hands" doctrine, and the principle of unjust enrichment.
In those actions in which a claim for reimbursement is pleaded de-
fensively by the fraudulent occupant the trend is to permit the rule
against unjust enrichment to control, thus entitling him to compensa-
tion. But in affirmative actions by the occupant the equitable maxim
concerning clean hands continues to govern and relief is denied.
The trend now being to grant the fraudulent occupant defensive
relief; the question arises, might equity be expected to yield eventually
in affirmative actions as well? The slavish adherence of the courts to
precedents in these cases would seem to dim the possibility of adoption
of a more liberal rule. One might well ask why such a policy is fol-
lowed. In effect the prevailing rule operates as a penalty, and perhaps
tends to discourage fraudulent transactions of this nature. But to what
extent should a court of equity undertake the punishment of misdeeds?
For that matter if the denial of relief is to penalize fraud, the argu-
ment could be applied with equal force in favor of continued or re-
newed denial of defensive relief.
Perhaps the most acceptable argument sustaining the prevailing rule
arises from the fact that the fraudulent occupant had a previous op-
portunity to litigate the matter. He could have sought reimbursement
from the rightful owner when the owner brought the action to recover
the property and for accounting. Having failed to take advantage of
that opportunity he should be denied the right to vex the rightful
owner with further litigation. GORDON DAvis
17 Fn. 15, supra.
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